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SYMPOSIUM
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, AND INDIGENOUS CULTURE
AN INTRODUCTION
Peter K. Yu*
Human communities have always generated, refined and
passed on knowledge from generation to generation. Such "traditional" knowledge" [sic] is often an importantpart of their cultural identities. Traditionalknowledge has played, and still plays,
a vital role in the daily lives of the vast majority of people. Traditional knowledge is essential to the food security and health of
millions of people in the developing world. In many countries,
traditionalmedicines provide the only affordable treatment available to poor people. In developing countries, up to 80% of the
population depend on traditional medicines to help meet their
healthcareneeds. In addition, knowledge of the healing properties of plants has been the source of many modern medicines.'
In recent years, the misappropriation of folklore, traditional
knowledge, and indigenous practices has become an increasingly
important issue in global politics. 2 In September 2000, the World
Copyright © 2003 Peter K. Yu. All rights reserved.
Acting Assistant Professor of Law, Executive Director, Intellectual Property Law
Program, and Deputy Director, Howard M. Squadron Program in Law, Media & Society,
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University; Research Associate, Programme
in Comparative Media Law and Policy, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford. The Author would like to thank past and present members of the CardozoJournal of
International & Comparative Law, in particular Elizabeth Bullard, Montgomery Engel,
Leigh Anne Kuiken, Antoinette Schindel, and Peter Wilner, for assistance in making this
symposium possible.
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1 COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 73 (2002) (footnotes omitted).

2 For discussions of the interplay of intellectual property and traditional knowledge,

see generally Rosemary J.Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' and Community TraditionalKnowledge in InternationalLaw, 14 ST.THOMAS L. REV. 275 (2001); David
R. Downes, How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool to Protect TraditionalKnowledge,
25 COLUM. J. ENVTL.L. 253 (2000); Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is IntellectualProperty the Answer?, 30 CONN.L. REV. 1 (1997); Paul Kuruk,
Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reappraisalof the Ten-

240

CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW

[Vol. 11:239

Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) established the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, which provides a
forum for governments to discuss intellectual property matters
concerning the access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing and
the protection of traditional knowledge, innovations and creativity,
and expressions of folklore.3 Similar issues have been raised and
discussed within the framework of the Convention on Biological
Diversity4 and by such international intergovernmental organizations as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), and the World Health Organization (WHO). Most
recently, in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, members of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) called for the Council for
TRIPS "to examine . . . the relationship between the TRIPS

Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity [and] the
protection of traditional knowledge and folklore."5
Despite the limited attention it has received (until lately), the
debate over the protection of folklore, traditional knowledge, and
indigenous practices impacts on a wide variety of policy areas, including agricultural productivity, biological diversity, cultural patrimony, food security, environmental sustainability, business ethics,
global competition, human rights, international trade, public
health, scientific research, sustainable development, and wealth
distribution. This debate becomes even more important in light of
growing dissatisfaction with the international trading system
sions Between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the United States, 48 AM. U.

L. REV. 769 (1999); Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous
Culture: An Intellectual Property Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229 (1998);
Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2 MinN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1

(2001); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific
and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MIcH. J.INT'L L. 919

(1996). See also Susan Scafidi, IntellectualPropertyand CulturalProducts, 81 B.U. L. REV.
793 (2001) (discussing the tension between group authorship and the current intellectual
property system).
3 The website of the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore is available at http://www.
wipo.int/globalissues/igc/index.html.
4 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
5 Ministerial Declaration
19, WTO Document No. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 14,
2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min0l-e/mindecl-e.doc.
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among less developed countries and of the recent anti-globalization protests in Seattle, Washington, Prague, Quebec, and Genoa.6
On February 21-22, 2002, the Cardozo Intellectual Property
Law Program brought together leading academics, economists, intellectual property lawyers, government officials, and representatives of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations to
explore the role of intellectual property in protecting folklore,
traditional knowledge, genetic resources, and indigenous practices.
Among the issues addressed include: How to define folklore and
traditional knowledge? Should traditional knowledge and indigenous creations be protected under the existing intellectual property
and cultural property regimes? What are the implications of protecting folklore for art and museums? How can policymakers balance the protection of traditional innovations and genetic
resources of indigenous peoples against the need for those materials in genomic research and in the development of pharmaceuticals, nutriceuticals, and bio-engineered products? Should the
international community develop a global regulatory regime or
should it strive for diverse protection that is consistent with the
local conditions of each individual country? How can governments
effectively negotiate traditional knowledge in the domestic and international fora?
So far, governments and intergovernmental organizations
have been focusing their energies, resources, and attention on understanding the issue. However, once they have acquired a deeper
understanding of, and greater practical experience on, this issue,
they might begin to develop international norms that seek to promote, protect, and preserve folklore, traditional knowledge, genetic resources, and indigenous practices. In light of such
6 See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DIscoNTENTs (2002)
(discussing the increasing dissatisfaction over such international bodies as the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization). See also Frederick
M. Abbott, TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-SurprisingFailure and the Future of the TRIPS
Agenda, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L LAW 165 (2000) (discussing the implications of the failed
Seattle Ministerial Conference for the future of the TRIPs Agreement); David A. Gantz,
Failed Efforts to Initiate the "Millennium Round" in Seattle: Lessons for Future Global
Trade Negotiations, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 349 (2000) (discussing the implications of
the failed Seattle Ministerial Conference for future global trade negotiations); Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 61 (2001) (arguing that the failed Seattle Ministerial Conference was the eruption
of long suppressed issues); Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protectionism: The Semiotics
of Seattle, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 257 (2000) (offering a proposal for reconciling the
concerns of the protestors in Seattle with the purposes and procedures of the WTO).
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development, this introduction discusses four issues that are seldom addressed by commentators.
First, the outcome of the negotiation process often depends on
the forum in which the parties conduct their negotiation.7 Indeed,
the international intergovernmental body that is responsible for organizing the treaty conference-be it FAO, UNCTAD, UNESCO,
WHO, WIPO, or WTO-has a strong ability to shape the terms of
the treaty, including its definitions, the scope of protection, the
remedies, and the enforcement mechanism.8 Even if we assumed
all the parties and issues involved were to be identical, a treaty
negotiated under the WTO regime would be very different from
one sponsored by WIPO.
Thus, if governments want to extend the protection of traditional knowledge beyond the intellectual property field-and perhaps into the international trade arena-a WIPO-sponsored treaty
will be highly unsatisfactory. Likewise, if governments want to create protection gradually and to limit initial protection to specific
intellectual property items, negotiating the treaty in the WTO
might not be ideal, as it might invite further complication of this
already very difficult issue by allowing governments to link intellectual property to other trade-related items-or even to reopen
discussions concerning other aspects of the WTO Agreements, including the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs). 9
As a result, policymakers have to be very careful in selecting
the forum in which they conduct their negotiation. Given the diverse array of issues involved in the protection of folklore, tradi7

See generally MICHAEL P.

RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION

AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

(1998); SUSAN K.

SELL, POWER AND

IDEAS: NORTH-SouTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST

(1998); SU-

SAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003); Symposium, World Trade, Intellectual Property, and the Global

Elites: Intellectual Property Lawmaking in the New Millennium, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1 (2002).

8 See

INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

189 (Anthony D'Amato & Do-

ris Estelle Long eds., 1996) (stating that "[o]ften the treaty that emerges from a multilateral treaty conference is noticeably shaped by the organization that provided the forum for

the conference"); see also

INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY

57-60 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the negotiation of intellectual
property treaties).
9 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND

vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
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tional knowledge, and indigenous practices, it would be very
unlikely that a single international intergovernmental organization
can shape, or even dominate, the discussions. As the U.K.-based
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights noted in its recent
report:
It is essential that all of the agencies considering the issue work
together to avoid unnecessary duplication and to ensure that the
debate includes as many different views as possible. . . . We
believe .. .that no single body is likely to have the capacity,

expertise or resources to handle all aspects of traditional knowledge. Indeed it is our view that a multiplicity of measures, only
some of them IP-related, will be necessary to protect, preserve
and promote traditional knowledge. 1"
Second, the success of the negotiation process often depends
on the mindsets of the negotiators. In particular, it depends on
whether the negotiators believe they are playing a zero-sum game
or a nonzero-sum game. In game theory terms, a zero-sum game is
a game in which a player's gain must result in another player's loss.
By contrast, in a nonzero-sum game, a player's gain will not necessarily result in another player's loss. Thus, negotiators having a
zero-sum mindset will be more likely to split the difference through
accommodation and compromises, whereas those having a
nonzero-sum mindset will be more likely to create forward-looking
solutions that provide mutual benefits to all the parties involved
while at the same time preserving the hard-earned relationships
among all the negotiating parties.11
Third, as conflict resolution scholars and cognitive psychologists have discussed in depth, policymakers face various psychological barriers during the negotiation process, and these barriers can
undermine their ability in making rational decisions. 12 For example, loss aversion is the tendency for decisionmakers to attach more
weight to prospective losses than to prospective gains of an equal
10 COMMISSION ON INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note

1, at 78.

11 See generally Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach to Resolving Global
Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn from Mediators, Business Strategists,
and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569 (2002).
12

See, e.g.,

ROBERT

H.

MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CRE-

ATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 156-72 (2000) (discussing psychological and cultural

barriers); Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need a Mediator for?": Mediation's
"Value-Added" for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 9-12 (1996) (discussing

cognitive barriers).
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value. 13 Policymakers who succumb to loss aversion might be more
receptive to proposals that protect traditional knowledge if they
focus on the potential benefits, rather than the potential costs, of
those proposals.
Another example is reactive devaluation-the tendency for
parties to devalue proposals offered by their adversaries even
though they will accept identical proposals put forward by their
allies or by neutral parties.' 4 Thus, if less developed countries perceive developed countries as their adversaries, they will tend to undervalue whatever proposals developed countries offer. By the
same token, if developed countries perceive less developed countries as their adversaries, and consider the traditional knowledge
debate an unjustified enlargement of the development agenda,
they also will undervalue whatever proposals less developed countries offer.
Finally, as many scholars and indigenous rights activists have
pointed out, the negotiation concerning the protection of traditional knowledge was significantly hampered by the lack of participation by the indigenous community. As Professor Rosemary
Coombe reminded us:
Although indigenous peoples are now recognized as key actors
in this global dialogue, it will need to be expanded to encompass
a wider range of principles and priorities, which will eventually
encompass political commitments to indigenous peoples' rights
of self-determination. Only when indigenous peoples are full
partners in this dialogue, with full juridical standing and only
when the their cultural world views, customary laws, and ecological practices are recognized as fundamental contributions to
resolving local social justice concerns will we be engaged in anything we can genuinely call a dialogue. 5
There is no doubt that policymakers should involve indigenous
peoples in the global dialogue. However, they should not ignore
the fact that many members of the traditional community remain
reluctant to participate in the negotiation process, partly due to
their concern about further abuse, misappropriation, and exploitation of their arts and crafts and partly due to the secretive nature of

supra note 12, at 161-64 (discussing loss aversion).
See id. at 165-66 (discussing reactive devaluation).
Coombe, supra note 2, at 284-85.

13 See MNOOKIN ET AL.,
14

15
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some of the indigenous creations and practices, such as sacred sym16
bols and religious rituals.
In fact, policymakers have to be vigilant and constantly evaluate whether the negotiation process contains any systematic bias or
barrier that makes participation difficult. After all, folklore, traditional knowledge, and indigenous practices were developed and
passed on from generations to generations through an oral tradition or by imitation. These materials do not fit well into the Western worldview, the capitalist philosophy, and the contemporary
notion of individual authorship, all of which underlie the develop17
ment of the current international intellectual property regime.
In sum, the choice of forum, the mindsets of the negotiators,
the extent and impact of cognitive barriers on the policymakers,
and the participation of the indigenous community in the negotiation process will play major roles in determining whether governments can create a mutually beneficial solution, whether they can
promote biological and cultural diversity, and whether they can establish a harmonized regime that effectively protects folklore,
traditional knowledge, and indigenous practices.

16 See, e.g., Farley, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing how some aboriginal designs are so
sacred that "they are viewed only during certain ceremonies, and only by those who have
attained the requisite level of initiation"); John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in
Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339, 356 (1989) (noting that some cultural objects "are
secret in nature, intended to be seen only by a restricted group of people at particular
times or exposed only in a specific place"); Scafidi, supra note 2, at 829-30 (discussing how
a newspaper photographer "violated and upset the Pueblo's balance of life" by taking photographs of a ceremonial dance while flying at low altitude over the Pueblo of Santo
Domingo).
17 As the Bellagio Declaration stated:
Contemporary intellectual property law is constructed around the notion of the
author, the individual, solitary and original creator, and it is for this figure that
its protections are reserved. Those who do not fit this model-custodians of
tribal culture and medical knowledge, collectives practicing traditional artistic
and music forms, or peasant cultivators of valuable seed varieties, for example-are denied intellectual property protection.

Bellagio Declaration, reprinted in

JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,

AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF INFORMATION SocIETY

SOFTWARE & SPLEENS: LAW

192, 193 (1996):

